"Bill Gates - Challenges & Strategy" - читать интересную книгу автора (Gates Bill)

based on their own merit rather than on some benefit of unfair knowledge
of system software. We need to explain our hardware neutral approach and
the benefits that has generated for end users. We need to have visible events
on a regular basis where we solicit the input of anyone who wants to influence
our future direction. If we can institutionalize a process that the world
feels comfortable with, we will strengthen our position incredibly. This is
going to require a lot more creativity than even the "Open Forums" we are
discussing. UNIX has OSF and X/Open -- we also need clear ways for
organizations of all types (hardware, ISV, IHV, corporation, universities) to
feel like they have something invested in our approach and can affect our
course.

IBM: IBM is proposing to take over the definition of PC desktop operating
systems. This would be a new role for them -- their previous attempts:
Topview and the 3270 control program, did not succeed. The barriers to thier
success are not only technical but structural. Why are they willing to lose
so much money on systems software? The answer is that they have a plan to
design the operating system so that their hardware (MCA) and applications
are tied in. Our disagreements with IBM over OS/2 were that we wanted to
push 2.0 and they wanted to push 1.3. Now they have switched to the
strategy that we proposed -- even using our marketing slogan "better windows
than Windows". We will not attack IBM as a company and even our public
"attacks" on OS/2 will be very professional. Our strategy is make sure
that we evolve the Windows API and get developers to take advantage of the
new features rapidly, while IBM has a poor product with poor Windows
functionality. Amazingly they are not cooperating with us on our
compatibility approach called WLO, but are trying the approach we did not
choose of using Windows code itself. Their lack of cooperation limits WLO
effectiveness and the Windows approach has contractual and technical problems
for them. We will do almost no work specific to OS/2 2.0 -- we will rely
on their 1.3 compatibility to run our applications and most of our networking
software. Our focus is on OS/2 3.0. If a cusotmer buys OS/2 2.0, the problem
for us is that they expect to get Extended Edition and perhpas some PM16
applications that may not be on 3.0 so we may have "lost" that customer.
Other than usability, making sure Windows is the winning OS is our highest
priority. Eventually we need to have at least a neutral relationship with
IBM. For the next 24 months it may be fairly cold. If we do succeed, then we
will be done forever with the poor code, poor design, poor process, and other
overhead that doing our best to do what IBM has led us to (for the past five
years). We can emerge as a better and stronger company where people won't
just say we are the standard because IBM chose us. In the large accounts
IBM will retain a some of its influence -- this is where our risk is
highest.

USABILITY/SUPPORT: If there is any area we have not paid enough attention
to it is usability/support. It is really embarrassing that people have to
wait so long on the phone to talk to us about problems in our products. The
number of customers who get bad impression because of this must number in
the millions worldwide. Why weren't we hiring at full speed and picking a new
site every day for the last three years? Why did people keep talking about