"federalist" - читать интересную книгу автора (Hamilton Alexander)

it will result that the administration, the political counsels, and
the judicial decisions of the national government will be more wise,
systematical, and judicious than those of individual States, and
consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations, as
well as more SAFE with respect to us.
Because, under the national government, treaties and articles of
treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded
in one sense and executed in the same manner,--whereas, adjudications
on the same points and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or
four confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent; and
that, as well from the variety of independent courts and judges
appointed by different and independent governments, as from the
different local laws and interests which may affect and influence
them. The wisdom of the convention, in committing such questions to
the jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by and responsible
only to one national government, cannot be too much commended.
Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often
tempt the governing party in one or two States to swerve from good
faith and justice; but those temptations, not reaching the other
States, and consequently having little or no influence on the
national government, the temptation will be fruitless, and good
faith and justice be preserved. The case of the treaty of peace
with Britain adds great weight to this reasoning.
Because, even if the governing party in a State should be
disposed to resist such temptations, yet as such temptations may,
and commonly do, result from circumstances peculiar to the State,
and may affect a great number of the inhabitants, the governing
party may not always be able, if willing, to prevent the injustice
meditated, or to punish the aggressors. But the national
government, not being affected by those local circumstances, will
neither be induced to commit the wrong themselves, nor want power or
inclination to prevent or punish its commission by others.
So far, therefore, as either designed or accidental violations
of treaties and the laws of nations afford JUST causes of war, they
are less to be apprehended under one general government than under
several lesser ones, and in that respect the former most favors the
SAFETY of the people.
As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and
unlawful violence, it appears equally clear to me that one good
national government affords vastly more security against dangers of
that sort than can be derived from any other quarter.
Because such violences are more frequently caused by the
passions and interests of a part than of the whole; of one or two
States than of the Union. Not a single Indian war has yet been
occasioned by aggressions of the present federal government, feeble
as it is; but there are several instances of Indian hostilities
having been provoked by the improper conduct of individual States,
who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offenses, have
given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants.
The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering