"Noel K Hannan - Bad Jihad" - читать интересную книгу автора (Hannan Noel K)

advance and was also, I feel, instrumental in altering the mental state of
the individual beyond the stable condition that we had worked hard to
maintain. In my opinion, this was the main cause of failure in Phase One.
PHASE TWO -- Advanced Training and Combat Orientation
The Biological Attack Djinn proved extremely receptive to military and
covert operations training. Our choice of a combat veteran was thoroughly
vindicated, it showed little or no fear during live fire exercises --
perhaps because it had already gazed on the face of Allah, and returned?
As the war drew to a close we were able to recruit many highly skilled
advisors as well as those who had experience of the 'dirty operations' as
taught to the Palestinian groups, the kind of environment that the B.A.D.
would encounter on the missions that it became apparent it was being
earmarked for, as large scale offensives became a thing of the past. It
proved as capable in the face of an assault by a captured Iraqi tank as it
did assassinating the sentries on a mock-up embassy. I am satisfied that
this phase was carried out to the best, if not beyond, of our abilities,
however the approach of the end of the war with Iraq and the marked change
of emphasis from overt to covert operations sowed a degree of confusion in
the subject's mind. Paradoxically, it is the intensity of the covert
operations training undertaken that currently makes the B.A.D. so elusive
for our agents to recapture.
PHASE THREE -- The Field Test
I am on record as stating that I was opposed to the planned field test. I
felt that it was an unnecessary risk of an invaluable resource, for
minimal research gains. At this point in the project, the emphasis had
changed completely, even the enemy was different. I have no doubt that the
objective was political. Forgive my candidness, but the order was carried
out without question.
The B.A.D. was inserted into the battlefield during the final week of the
long war that we had waged against the aggressor Iraq. I had absolute
faith in the B.A.D.'s abilities but it could not win a war single handed
and besides, it has primarily been designed as a prototype for the
manufacture of hundreds of thousands of such units. The B.A.D.'s heroic
exploits in those seven days before the ceasefire are the stuff of
legends, and are well documented elsewhere. Less well known, of course, is
the failure of the unit to return to base and its current whereabouts,
some six months later. There have been numerous suspected sightings across
the Gulf region and the Islamic world, but as yet our agents have not
positively identified the unit's movements and above all, its motives.
Of course, its re-assigned primary mission remains unfulfilled. Rushdie
still lives, under heavy guard by British intelligence at an unknown
location. Whether or not the B.A.D. retains enough programming or human
desire to carry out its primary function remains to be seen. If reports of
its appearance alongside Mujahideen in Afghanistan are accurate, then it
appears to be fighting a wider Jihad than we first envisaged for it. The
fatwa remains unresolved, and I did not get the opportunity to implement
the revised Phase Four, the assassination of the Heretic Writer.
*
I have of course received your order to purge this site. The order is at
the moment being carried out by the unit of the Revolutionary Guard that