"David Hume - On the First Principles of Government" - читать интересную книгу автора (Hume David)

influence in this subject.
Upon these three opinions, therefore, of public interest, of
right to power, and of right to property, are all governments
founded, and all authority of the few over the many. There are
indeed other principles, which add force to these, and determine,
limit, or alter their operation; such as self-interest, fear, and
affection: But still we may assert, that these other principles
can have no influence alone, but suppose the antecedent influence
of those opinions above-mentioned. They are, therefore, to be
esteemed the secondary, not the original principles of
government.
For, first, as to self-interest, by which I mean the
expectation of particular rewards, distinct from the general
protection which we receive from government, it is evident that
the magistrate's authority must be antecedently established, at
least be hoped for, in order to produce this expectation. The
prospect of reward may augment his authority with regard to some
particular persons; but can never give birth to it, with regard
to the public. Men naturally look for the greatest favours from
their friends and acquaintance; and therefore, the hopes of any
considerable number of the state would never center in any
particular set of men, if these men had no other title to
magistracy, and had no separate influence over the opinions of
mankind. The same observation may be extended to the other two
principles of fear and affection. No man would have any reason to
fear the fury of a tyrant, if he had no authority over any but
from fear; since, as a single man, his bodily force can reach but
a small way, and all the farther power he possesses must be
founded either on our own opinion, or on the presumed opinion of
others. And though affection to wisdom and virtue in a sovereign
extends very far, and has great influence; yet he must
antecedently be supposed invested with a public character,
otherwise the public esteem will serve him in no stead, nor will
his virtue have any influence beyond a narrow sphere.
A Government may endure for several ages, though the balance
of power, and the balance of property do not coincide. This
chiefly happens, where any rank or order of the state has
acquired a large share in the property; but from the original
constitution of the government, has no share in the power. Under
what pretence would any individual of that order assume authority
in public affairs? As men are commonly much attached to their
ancient government, it is not to be expected, that the public
would ever favour such usurpations. But where the original
constitution allows any share of power, though small, to an order
of men, who possess a large share of the property, it is easy for
them gradually to stretch their authority, and bring the balance
of power to coincide with that of property. This has been the
case with the house of commons in ENGLAND.
Most writers, that have treated of the BRITISH government,
have supposed, that, as the lower house represents all the