"Hume, David - Letter to a friend in Edinburgh [PG]" - читать интересную книгу автора (Hume David)

Perceptions, but can never observe it between Perceptions and
Objects."

'Tis impossible therefore, that, from the Existence or any of the
Qualities of the former, we can ever form any Conclusion concerning
the Existence of the latter, or ever satisfy our Reason in this
Particular with regard to the Existence of a Supreme Being. 'Tis well
known that this Principle, Whatever begins to exist must have a Cause
of Existence, is the first Step in the Argument for the Being of a
Supreme Cause; and that, without it, 'tis impossible to go one Step
further in that Argument. Now this Maxim he is at great Pains from
p.141. to explode, and to show, "That it is neither intuitively nor
demonstratively certain;" and he says,

"Reason can never satisfy us that the Existence of any Object does
ever imply that of another. So that, when we pass from the
Impression of one to the Idea and Belief of another, we are not
determined by Reason, but by Custom."

In a marginal Note on the preceeding Page he says,

"In that Proposition, God is, or indeed any other which regards
Existence, the Idea of Existence is no distinct Idea {12} which we
unite with that of the Object, and which is capable of forming a
compound Idea by the Union."

Concerning this Principle, That the Deity is the prime Mover of the
Universe, who first created Matter, and gave its original Impulse, and
likewise supports its Existence, and successively bestows on it its
Motions; he says,

"This Opinion is certainly very curious, but it will appear
superfluous to examine it in this Place. --For, if the very Idea
be derived from an Impression, the Idea of a Deity proceeds from
the same Origin; and, if no Impression implies any Force or
Efficacy, 'tis equally impossible to discover, or even imagine,
any such active Principle in the Deity. --Since Philosophers
therefore have concluded, that Matter cannot be endowed with any
efficacious Principle, because it is impossible to discover in it
such a Principle; the same Course of Reasoning should determine
them to exclude it from the Supreme Being: Or if they esteem that
Opinion absurd and impious, as it really is, I shall tell them how
they may avoid it, and that is, by concluding from the very first,
that they have no adequate Idea of Power of Efficacy in any
Object; since neither in Body nor Spirit, neither in Superior nor
{13} Inferior Natures, are they able to discover one single
Instance of it."

And says he, "We have no Idea of a Being endowed with any Power, much
less of one endowed with any infinite Power."