"Hume, David - Letter to a friend in Edinburgh [PG]" - читать интересную книгу автора (Hume David)

not naturally attach'd to the Observation of the Rules of
Justice, but {15} is only connected with it, after an
artificial Convention, for Establishment of these Rules.
Unless we will allow that Nature has established a
Sophistry, and rendered it necessary and unavoidable; we
must allow that the Sense of Justice and Injustice is not
derived from Nature, but arises artificially, tho'
necessarily, from Education and human Conventions. Here is
a Proposition which I think may be regarded as certain,
That it is only from the Selfishness and confined
Generosity of Men, along with the scanty Provision Nature
has made for his Wants, that Justice derives its Origin.
These Impressions, which give Rise to this Sense of
Justice, are not natural to the Mind of Man, but arise
from Artifice and human Conventions. Without such a
Convention, no one would ever have dreamed that there was
such a Virtue as Justice, or have been induced to conform
his Actions to it. Taking any single Act, my Justice may
be pernicious in every Respect: And 'tis only upon the
Supposition that others are to imitate my Example, that I
can be induced to embrace that Virtue; since nothing but
the Combination can render Justice advantageous, or afford
me any Motive to conform myself to its Rules. {16} And in
general it may be affirmed, that there is no such Passion
in human Minds, as the Love of Mankind merely as such,
independent of personal Qualities, of Service or of
Relation to ourself."

Mr. Hobbs, who was at Pains to shake loose all other natural
Obligations, yet found it necessary to leave, or pretended to
leave, the Obligation of Promises or Pactions; but our Author
strikes a bolder Stroke:

"That the Rule of Morality (says he) which enjoins the
Performance of Promises, is not natural, will sufficiently
appear from these two Propositions, which I proceed to
prove, viz. That a Promise would not be intelligible
before humans Conventions had established it; and that,
even if it were intelligible, it would not be attended
with any moral Obligation."

And he concludes, "That Promises impose no natural Obligation." And,
p.115.

"I shall further observe, That since every new Promise imposes a
new Obligation of Morality upon the Person who promises, and since
this new Obligation arises from his Will, it is one of the most
mysterious and incomprehensible Operations that can possible be
imagined, and may even be compared to Transubstantiation or Holy
Orders, where a certain Form of Words, along with a {17} certain