"The Virtue of Selfishness" - читать интересную книгу автора (Rand Ayn)
The title of this book may evoke the kind of question that I hear once in a while: УWhy do you use the word СselfishnessТ to denote virtuous qualities of character, when that word antagonizes so many people to whom it does not mean the things you mean?Ф
To those who ask it, my answer is: УFor the reason that makes you afraid of it.Ф
But there are others, who would not ask that question, sensing the moral cowardice it implies, yet who are unable to formulate my actual reason or to identify the profound moral issue involved. It is to them that I will give a more explicit answer.
It is not a mere semantic issue nor a matter of arbitrary choice. The meaning ascribed in popular usage to the word УselfishnessФ is not merely wrong: it represents a devastating intellectual Уpackage-deal,Ф which is responsible, more than any other single factor, for the arrested moral development of mankind.
In popular usage, the word УselfishnessФ is a synonym of evil; the image it conjures is of a murderous brute who tramples over piles of corpses to achieve his own ends, who cares for no living being and pursues nothing but the gratification of the mindless whims of any immediate moment.
Yet the exact meaning and dictionary definition of the word УselfishnessФ is: concern with oneТs own interests.
This concept does not include a moral evaluation; it does not tell us whether concern with oneТs own interests is good or evil; nor does it tell us what constitutes manТs actual interests. It is the task of ethics to answer such questions.
The ethics of altruism has created the image of the brute, as its answer, in order to make men accept two inhuman tenets: (a) that any concern with oneТs own interests is evil, regardless of what these interests might be, and (b) that the bruteТs activities are in fact to oneТs own interest (which altruism enjoins man to renounce for the sake of his neighbors).
For a view of the nature of altruism, its consequences and the enormity of the moral corruption it perpetrates, I shall refer you to Atlas ShruggedЧor to any of todayТs newspaper headlines. What concerns us here is altruismТs default in the field of ethical theory.
There are two moral questions which altruism lumps together into one Уpackage-dealФ: (1) What are values? (2) Who should be the beneficiary of values? Altruism substitutes the second for the first; it evades the task of defining a code of moral values, thus leaving man, in fact, without moral guidance.
Altruism declares that any action taken for the benefit of others is good, and any action taken for oneТs own benefit is evil. Thus the beneficiary of an action is the only criterion of moral valueЧand so long as that beneficiary is anybody other than oneself, anything goes.
Hence the appalling immorality, the chronic injustice, the grotesque double standards, the insoluble conflicts and contradictions that have characterized human relationships and human societies throughout history, under all the variants of the altruist ethics.
Observe the indecency of what passes for moral judgments today. An industrialist who produces a fortune, and a gangster who robs a bank are regarded as equally immoral, since they both sought wealth for their own УselfishФ benefit. A young man who gives up his career in order to support his parents and never rises beyond the rank of grocery clerk is regarded as morally superior to the young man who endures an excruciating struggle and achieves his personal ambition. A dictator is regarded as moral, since the unspeakable atrocities he committed were intended to benefit Уthe people,Ф not himself.
Observe what this beneficiary-criterion of morality does to a manТs life. The first thing he learns is that morality is his enemy; he has nothing to gain from it, he can only lose; self-inflicted loss, self-inflicted pain and the gray, debilitating pall of an incomprehensible duty is all that he can expect. He may hope that others might occasionally sacrifice themselves for his benefit, as he grudgingly sacrifices himself for theirs, but he knows that the relationship will bring mutual resentment, not pleasureЧand that, morally, their pursuit of values will be like an exchange of unwanted, unchosen Christmas presents, which neither is morally permitted to buy for himself. Apart from such times as he manages to perform some act of self-sacrifice, he possesses no moral significance: morality takes no cognizance of him and has nothing to say to him for guidance in the crucial issues of his life; it is only his own personal, private, УselfishФ life and, as such, it is regarded either as evil or, at best, amoral.
Since nature does not provide man with an automatic form of survival, since he has to support his life by his own effort, the doctrine that concern with oneТs own interests is evil means that manТs desire to live is evilЧthat manТs life, as such, is evil. No doctrine could be more evil than that.
Yet that is the meaning of altruism, implicit in such examples as the equation of an industrialist with a robber. There is a fundamental moral difference between a man who sees his self-interest in production and a man who sees it in robbery. The evil of a robber does not lie in the fact that he pursues his own interests, but in what he regards as to his own interest; not in the fact that he pursues his values, but in what he chose to value; not in the fact that he wants to live, but in the fact that he wants to live on a subhuman level (see УThe Objectivist EthicsФ).
If it is true that what I mean by УselfishnessФ is not what is meant conventionally, then this is one of the worst indictments of altruism: it means that altruism permits no concept of a self-respecting, self-supporting manЧa man who supports his life by his own effort and neither sacrifices himself nor others. It means that altruism permits no view of men except as sacrificial animals and profiteers-on-sacrifice, as victims and parasitesЧthat it permits no concept of a benevolent co-existence among menЧthat it permits no concept of justice.
If you wonder about the reasons behind the ugly mixture of cynicism and guilt in which most men spend their lives, these are the reasons: cynicism, because they neither practice nor accept the altruist moralityЧguilt, because they dare not reject it.
To rebel against so devastating an evil, one has to rebel against its basic premise. To redeem both man and morality, it is the concept of УselfishnessФ that one has to redeem.
The first step is to assert manТs right to a moral existenceЧthat is: to recognize his need of a moral code to guide the course and the fulfillment of his own life.
For a brief outline of the nature and the validation of a rational morality, see my lecture on УThe Objectivist EthicsФ which follows. The reasons why man needs a moral code will tell you that the purpose of morality is to define manТs proper values and interests, that concern with his own interests is the essence of a moral existence, and that man must be the beneficiary of his own moral actions.
The choice of the beneficiary of moral values is merely a preliminary or introductory issue in the field of morality. It is not a substitute for morality nor a criterion of moral value, as altruism has made it. Neither is it a moral primary: it has to be derived from and validated by the fundamental premises of a moral system.
The Objectivist ethics holds that the actor must always be the beneficiary of his action and that man must act for his own rational self-interest. But his right to do so is derived from his nature as man and from the function of moral values in human lifeЧand, therefore, is applicable only in the context of a rational, objectively demonstrated and validated code of moral principles which define and determine his actual self-interest. It is not a license Уto do as he pleasesФ and it is not applicable to the altruistsТ image of a УselfishФ brute nor to any man motivated by irrational emotions, feelings, urges, wishes or whims.
This is said as a warning against the kind of УNietzschean egoistsФ who, in fact, are a product of the altruist morality and represent the other side of the altruist coin: the men who believe that any action, regardless of its nature, is good if it is intended for oneТs own benefit. Just as the satisfaction of the irrational desires of others is not a criterion of moral value, neither is the satisfaction of oneТs own irrational desires. Morality is not a contest of whims. (See Mr. BrandenТs articles УCounterfeit IndividualismФ and УIsnТt Everyone Selfish?Ф which follow.)
A similar type of error is committed by the man who declares that since man must be guided by his own independent judgment, any action he chooses to take is moral if he chooses it. OneТs own independent judgment is the means by which one must choose oneТs actions, but it is not a moral criterion nor a moral validation: only reference to a demonstrable principle can validate oneТs choices.
Just as man cannot survive by any random means, but must discover and practice the principles which his survival requires, so manТs self-interest cannot be determined by blind desires or random whims, but must be discovered and achieved by the guidance of rational principles. This is why the Objectivist ethics is a morality of rational self-interestЧor of rational selfishness.
Since selfishness is Уconcern with oneТs own interests,Ф the Objectivist ethics uses that concept in its exact and purest sense. It is not a concept that one can surrender to manТs enemies, nor to the unthinking misconceptions, distortions, prejudices and fears of the ignorant and the irrational. The attack on УselfishnessФ is an attack on manТs self-esteem; to surrender one, is to surrender the other.
Now a word about the material in this book. With the exception of the lecture on ethics, it is a collection of essays that have appeared in The Objectivist Newsletter, a monthly journal of ideas, edited and published by Nathaniel Branden and myself. The Newsletter deals with the application of the philosophy of Objectivism to the issues and problems of todayТs cultureЧmore specifically, with that intermediary level of intellectual concern which lies between philosophical abstractions and the journalistic concretes of day-by-day existence. Its purpose is to provide its readers with a consistent philosophical frame of reference.
This collection is not a systematic discussion of ethics, but a series of essays on those ethical subjects which needed clarification, in todayТs context, or which had been most confused by altruismТs influence. You may observe that the titles of some of the essays are in the form of a question. These come from our УIntellectual Ammunition DepartmentФ that answers questions sent in by our readers.
ЧAYN RAND
New York, September 1964
P.S. Nathaniel Branden is no longer associated with me, with my philosophy or with The Objectivist (formerly The Objectivist Newsletter).
ЧA. R.
New York, November 1970
1. The Objectivist Ethics
by Ayn Rand
Since I am to speak on the Objectivist Ethics, I shall begin by quoting its best representativeЧJohn Galt, in Atlas Shrugged:
УThrough centuries of scourges and disasters, brought about by your code of morality, you have cried that your code had been broken, that the scourges were punishment for breaking it, that men were too weak and too selfish to spill all the blood it required. You damned man, you damned existence, you damned this earth, but never dared to question your code. ... You went on crying that your code was noble, but human nature was not good enough to practice it. And no one rose to ask the question: Good?Чby what standard?
УYou wanted to know John GaltТs identity. I am the man who has asked that question.
УYes, this is an age of moral crisis. ... Your moral code has reached its climax, the blind alley at the end of its course. And if you wish to go on living, what you now need is not to return to morality ... but to discover it.Ф1
What is morality, or ethics? It is a code of values to guide manТs choices and actionsЧthe choices and actions that determine the purpose and the course of his life. Ethics, as a science, deals with discovering and defining such a code.
The first question that has to be answered, as a precondition of any attempt to define, to judge or to accept any specific system of ethics, is: Why does man need a code of values?
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