"Viktor Suvorov. Inside soviet military intelligence (англ) " - читать интересную книгу автора

activists labouring strenuously to fulfil the will of Soviet intelligence.
Thirdly, after the Revolution millions of emigres appeared from Russia, all
over the world. Any Soviet intelligence officer who had undergone the most
elementary linguistic training could move about freely from country to
country without attracting the slightest suspicion.
External circumstances favoured communism too. After the First World
War the world veered sharply towards communist doctrines. Communist parties
were strong and united. In Germany and Hungary there were communist
revolutions. The heat of the conflagration was felt in Spain, France and
China. Soviet intelligence skilfully exploited the situation which was
unfolding. The First World War also left behind a legacy of despair - the
world had given way and there were many people who had lost their hopes and
ideals. Embittered and depressed, their recruitment presented no difficulty
whatsoever. In one of the early GRU instruction manuals there is the
following advice: 'If you need a facilities agent (a radio operator, owner
of a safe house or transmission point) find a tall handsome man who has lost
a leg or an arm in the war.'
One last, but by no means negligible factor, is that Russia has always
possessed too much gold. After the Revolution, mountains of gold from
millions of people killed in the torture chambers of Soviet power were added
to the State Treasury. In addition to this, communists plundered churches
all over Russia which from ancient times had been famous for their wealth.
Great profit was harvested from the domes of the richest cathedrals, for
these were roofed with solid gold. In looting the churches, the communists
said, 'For the needs of the world revolution.' What they meant was, 'For the
needs of espionage.'
x x x
There were many elementary errors and failures in the work of these
early field officers who had no experience whatsoever. For example, the
counter-intelligence officers of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, which at the
time were independent states, simply told any suspicious person who claimed
to be a fugitive Russian officer, or engineer or doctor, to tie a necktie.
In 1920, by this method alone, more than forty GRU agents were unmasked in
these three small countries. The GRU was unperturbed by these failures,
however, its philosophy being that if it could not have quality it would go
for quantity. It was an astute calculation. If one agent in a hundred sent
abroad showed himself to be talented, and his natural talent made up for his
lack of education, then that was enough. Nobody was worried about the agents
who were discovered. Let them get out of the mess if they could. The Soviet
Union will never admit that the people it sends out belong to Soviet
intelligence.
This large-scale attack was highly successful. Out of the thousands of
intelligence agents sent abroad, some dozen began to give positive results.
The help of communists abroad also began to tell. Gradually quality began to
creep into the work of the GRU. One of the first outstanding successes was
the creation of the so-called 'Mrachkovski Enterprises' or, as it was
officially called in GRU documents, 'the network of commercial
undertakings'. Jacob Mrachkovski (his brother was a member of the Central
Committee) was sent to Germany where he organised a small shop and then a
small factory. Subsequently he bought, in fictitious names, several