"Viktor Suvorov. Inside soviet military intelligence (англ) " - читать интересную книгу автора

during the advances of the Eastern Front in the Urals and in Siberia, agent
groups and organisations intervened in the rear of the enemy before the main
forces attacked. Subsequent to the formation of the Eastern Front, new
fronts were added to the Red Army: the Southern, Ukrainian, Northern,
Turkistan and, later, Caucasian, Western, South- Eastern, North-Eastern and
others. The intelligence set-up for each front was organised in the same way
as that for the Eastern Front. There were also some independent and separate
armies which did not form part of the fronts, and these, as a rule, had
their own independent networks.
In the spring of 1918, besides the agent, aerial and other types of
intelligence services, the diversionary intelligence service came into
being. These diversionary detachments reported to the intelligence chiefs of
fronts, armies, corps and sometimes divisions, and were called the 'cavalry
of special assignments'. Formed from the best cavalrymen in the Army, they
dressed in the uniform of the enemy and were used to carry out deep raids in
the enemy's rear, to take prisoners - especially staff officers - to collect
information on enemy positions and activities and to undermine and sometimes
physically destroy the enemy's command structure. The number of these
diversionary units and their numerical strength constantly increased. In
1920, on the Polish Front, on the staff of the Soviet forces, there was a
separate cavalry brigade for 'special assignments' with a strength of more
than two thousand cavalrymen, and this was on top of several regiments and
separate squadrons. All these units were dressed in Polish uniform. Much
later these diversionary units received the name Spetsnaz, now given to all
special forces of the GRU.
>From its inception, military intelligence suffered the greatest
Possible antagonism from the Tchekists. The Tcheka had its own central agent
network and an agent network in local areas. The Tchekists jealously guarded
their right to have secret agents and could not resign themselves to the
idea that anyone else was operating similar secret networks. The Tcheka also
had units of 'special assignments' which carried out raids, not in the
enemy's rear, but in its own rear, destroying those who were dissatisfied
with the communist order.
During the civil war the Tcheka strove to unite all special assignment
units under its own control. Several cases are recorded of the Tchekists
trying to take over organs of military intelligence. One such attempt
occurred on 10 July 1918 when the Tcheka shot the whole staff of the Eastern
Front intelligence department, which had been in existence for only twenty-
seven days, together with the entire staff of the front and the commander
himself, M. A. Muravev, who had been trying to intervene in favour of his
intelligence department. The whole of the agent system of military
intelligence passed into the control of the Tchekists, but this brought the
front to the very edge of catastrophe. The new commander, I. I. Vatsetis,
and his chief of staff had no intelligence service of their own, and were
unable to ask for the necessary information. They could only request
information in a very tactful way, being well aware of the Tcheka's attitude
to those it disliked. (As regards Vatsetis the Tchekists did indeed shoot
him, but much later.)
Naturally while the agent network was under the control of the Tcheka,
its own work was given priority, and any tasks set it by the Army Command