"Viktor Suvorov. Inside soviet military intelligence (англ) " - читать интересную книгу автора

of the Field Staff of the Republic.
The newly created directorate did not increase or decrease the
importance of the front and army intelligence services, it merely co-
ordinated them. But at this time the directorate began the creation of a new
network of agents which could be active in countries all over the world,
including those where the front networks already had active agents. The
organisation created in 1918 has, in principle, survived to the present day.
Certainly the founding rules are fully applicable to our own time. These
are, firstly, that each military staff must have its own independent
intelligence set-up. Secondly, the intelligence set-up of subordinate staffs
is to be fully under the command of the intelligence of superior formations.
Thirdly, the agent network must be part of the composition of the general
staff intelligence network and part of the composition of the front and
fleet intelligence services. (In peace-time this means military districts
and groups of forces.) Fourthly, diversionary intelligence is subsidiary to
agent intelligence. It must be found on front or fleet level, military
districts and groups of forces and also at the level of armies and
flotillas. And, fifthly and most importantly, military intelligence must be
quite separate from the organs of enforcement and their intelligence
services. Since 1918, each one of these rules has been broken at least once,
if not more often, but invariably the mistake has been summarily corrected.
The creation of the GRU [The GRU, like the KGB, has been through
several name changes in its history; at this time it was called
'Registraupr', later 'Razvedupr'. For our present purposes the name GRU will
be used consistently.] was not only an act of self-preservation on Lenin's
part from the ravages of the Tcheka, but also a concession to Trotsky.
Having entrusted this weapon to Trotsky and the Army, Lenin was careful to
equip it with a safety device by the name of Simon Ivanovich Aralov, who
came from the V. Tcheka. On becoming chief of the registrational
directorate, Aralov formally remained a member of the collegium of the
Tcheka. This step was taken in the interests of subterfuge, and even up to
the present day has confused many researchers. Remaining formally within the
Tcheka, Aralov, from the first day of his work in military intelligence, had
to become a rival and consequently enemy of the Tchekists. This had entered
into Lenin's calculations; he had not been slow to see that it would be
impossible for Aralov to avoid daily skirmishes with the Tchekists on the
most mundane questions, and that this would inevitably lead to a
confrontation which would preclude any possibility of Aralov being exploited
as a trusted Tchekist. But this was not all. In the case of any agreement
with the Army, not one of the Army's chiefs would dare to trust Aralov. The
GRU would be a part of the Army but the Army would not be able to make use
of the GRU in the struggle against the Party and the Tcheka.
Lenin's calculations proved themselves sound remarkably quickly. In the
spring of 1919 the reinforced army under Trotsky's leadership openly came
out against the Party's meddling in the affairs of the Army. A united group
of Army delegates, the so-called 'Military Opposition', at the eighth
congress of the Party in March 1919, demanded de facto independence of the
Army from Party influences. At that time it was still permitted to express
personal opinions at party conferences, and more than 100 delegates out of
269 declared themselves in favour of the military programme. There were