"Three Dialogues" - читать интересную книгу автора (Berkeley George)

. In neither; for whoever understands English cannot
but know that signifies a suspense between both.

. He then that denies any point, can no more be said
to doubt of it, than he who affirmeth it with the same degree of
assurance.

. True.

. And, consequently, for such his denial is no more to
be esteemed a sceptic than the other.

. I acknowledge it.

. How cometh it to pass then, Hylas, that you
pronounce me , because I deny what you affirm, to wit,
the existence of Matter? Since, for aught you can tell, I am as
peremptory in my denial, as you in your affirmation.

. Hold, Philonous, I have been a little out in my
definition; but every false step a man makes in discourse is not
to be insisted on. I said indeed that a was one who
doubted of everything; but I should have added, or who denies the
reality and truth of things.

. What things? Do you mean the principles and theorems
of sciences? But these you know are universal intellectual
notions, and consequently independent of Matter. The denial
therefore of this doth not imply the denying them.

. I grant it. But are there no other things? What think
you of distrusting the senses, of denying the real existence of
sensible things, or pretending to know nothing of them. Is not
this sufficient to denominate a man a ?

. Shall we therefore examine which of us it is that
denies the reality of sensible things, or professes the greatest
ignorance of them; since, if I take you rightly, he is to be
{174} esteemed the greatest ?

. That is what I desire.

. What mean you by Sensible Things?

. Those things which are perceived by the senses. Can
you imagine that I mean anything else?

. Pardon me, Hylas, if I am desirous clearly to
apprehend your notions, since this may much shorten our inquiry.
Suffer me then to ask you this farther question. Are those things