"Treatise" - читать интересную книгу автора (Berkeley George)

idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and which is neither
swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; and the like may be
said of all other abstract general ideas whatsoever. To be plain, I
own myself able to abstract in one sense, as when I consider some
particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which,
though they are united in some object, yet it is possible they may
really exist without them. But I deny that I can abstract from one
another, or conceive separately, those qualities which it is
impossible should exist so separated; or that I can frame a general
notion, by abstracting from particulars in the manner aforesaid- which
last are the two proper acceptations of abstraction. And there are
grounds to think most men will acknowledge themselves to be in my
case. The generality of men which are simple and illiterate never
pretend to abstract notions. It is said they are difficult and not
to be attained without pains and study; we may therefore reasonably
conclude that, if such there be, they are confined only to the
learned.

11. I proceed to examine what can be alleged in defence of the
doctrine of abstraction, and try if I can discover what it is that
inclines the men of speculation to embrace an opinion so remote from
common sense as that seems to be. There has been a late deservedly
esteemed philosopher who, no doubt, has given it very much
countenance, by seeming to think the having abstract general ideas
is what puts the widest difference in point of understanding betwixt
man and beast. "The having of general ideas," saith he, "is that which
puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an
excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain unto.
For, it is evident we observe no foot-steps in them of making use of
general signs for universal ideas; from which we have reason to
imagine that they have not the faculty of abstracting, or making
general ideas, since they have no use of words or any other general
signs." And a little after: "Therefore, I think, we may suppose that
it is in this that the species of brutes are discriminated from men,
and it is that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated,
and which at last widens to so wide a distance. For, if they have
any ideas at all, and are not bare machines (as some would have them),
we cannot deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident to me
that they do, some of them, in certain instances reason as that they
have sense; but it is only in particular ideas, just as they receive
them from their senses. They are the best of them tied up within those
narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them
by any kind of abstraction."- Essay on Human Understanding, II. xi. 10
and 11. I readily agree with this learned author, that the faculties
of brutes can by no means attain to abstraction. But then if this be
made the distinguishing property of that sort of animals, I fear a
great many of those that pass for men must be reckoned into their
number. The reason that is here assigned why we have no grounds to
think brutes have abstract general ideas is, that we observe in them
no use of words or any other general signs; which is built on this