"Treatise" - читать интересную книгу автора (Berkeley George)

supposition- that the making use of words implies the having general
ideas. From which it follows that men who use language are able to
abstract or generalize their ideas. That this is the sense and arguing
of the author will further appear by his answering the question he
in another place puts: "Since all things that exist are only
particulars, how come we by general terms?" His answer is: "Words
become general by being made the signs of general ideas."- Essay on
Human Understanding, IV. iii. 6. But it seems that a word becomes
general by being made the sign, not of an abstract general idea, but
of several particular ideas, any one of which it indifferently
suggests to the mind. For example, when it is said "the change of
motion is proportional to the impressed force," or that "whatever
has extension is divisible," these propositions are to be understood
of motion and extension in general; and nevertheless it will not
follow that they suggest to my thoughts an idea of motion without a
body moved, or any determinate direction and velocity, or that I
must conceive an abstract general idea of extension, which is
neither line, surface, nor solid, neither great nor small, black,
white, nor red, nor of any other determinate colour. It is only
implied that whatever particular motion I consider, whether it be
swift or slow, perpendicular, horizontal, or oblique, or in whatever
object, the axiom concerning it holds equally true. As does the
other of every particular extension, it matters not whether line,
surface, or solid, whether of this or that magnitude or figure.

12. By observing how ideas become general we may the better judge
how words are made so. And here it is to be noted that I do not deny
absolutely there are general ideas, but only that there are any
abstract general ideas; for, in the passages we have quoted wherein
there is mention of general ideas, it is always supposed that they are
formed by abstraction, after the manner set forth in sections 8 and 9.
Now, if we will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what
we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea which,
considered in itself, is particular, becomes general by being made
to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort.
To make this plain by an example, suppose a geometrician is
demonstrating the method of cutting a line in two equal parts. He
draws, for instance, a black line of an inch in length: this, which in
itself is a particular line, is nevertheless with regard to its
signification general, since, as it is there used, it represents all
particular lines whatsoever; so that what is demonstrated of it is
demonstrated of all lines, or, in other words, of a line in general.
And, as that particular line becomes general by being made a sign,
so the name "line," which taken absolutely is particular, by being a
sign is made general. And as the former owes its generality not to its
being the sign of an abstract or general line, but of all particular
right lines that may possibly exist, so the latter must be thought
to derive its generality from the same cause, namely, the various
particular lines which it indifferently denotes.