"Meditations On First Philosophy" - читать интересную книгу автора (Descartes Rene)

it forth at length in French and in a Discourse which might be
read by everyone, in case the feebler minds should believe
that it was permitted to them to attempt to follow the same
path.

But, having in this Discourse on Method begged all those
who have found in my writings somewhat deserving of censure to
do me the favour of acquainting me with the grounds of it,
nothing worthy of remark has been objected to in them beyond
two matters: to these two I wish here to reply in a few words
before undertaking their more detailed discussion.

The first objection is that it does not follow from the
fact that the human mind reflecting on itself does not
perceive itself to be other than a thing that thinks, that its
nature or its essence consists only in its being a thing that
thinks, in the sense that this word only excludes all other
things which might also be supposed to pertain to the nature
of the soul. To this objection I reply that it was not my
intention in that place to exclude these in accordance with
the order that looks to the truth of the matter (as to which I
was not then dealing), but only in accordance with the order
of my thought [perception]; thus my meaning was that so far as
I was aware, I knew nothing clearly as belonging to my
essence, excepting that I was a thing that thinks, or a thing
that has in itself the faculty of thinking. But I shall show
hereafter how from the fact that I know no other thing which
pertains to my essence, it follows that there is no other
thing which really does belong to it.

The second objection is that it does not follow from the
fact that I have in myself the idea of something more perfect
than I am, that this idea is more perfect than I, and much
less that what is represented by this idea exists. But I
reply that in this term idea there is here something
equivocal, for it may either be taken materially, as an act of
my understanding, and in this sense it cannot be said that it
is more perfect than I; or it may be taken objectively, as the
thing which is represented by this act, which, although we do
not suppose it to exist outside of my understanding, may, none
the less, be more perfect than I, because of its essence. And
in following out this Treatise I shall show more fully how,
from the sole fact that I have in myself the idea of a thing
more perfect than myself, it follows that this thing truly
exists.

In addition to these two objections I have also seen two
fairly lengthy works on this subject, which, however, did not
so much impugn my reasonings as my conclusions, and this by
arguments drawn from the ordinary atheistic sources. But,