"Discourses" - читать интересную книгу автора (Epictetus)

which derive their conclusions from questioning, and in a word the
handling of all such arguments, relates to the duties of life,
though the many do not know this truth. For in every matter we inquire
how the wise and good man shall discover the proper path and the
proper method of dealing with the matter. Let, then, people either say
that the grave man will not descend into the contest of question and
answer, or that, if he does descend into the contest, he will take
no care about not conducting himself rashly or carelessly in
questioning and answering. But if they do not allow either the one
or the other of these things, they must admit that some inquiry
ought to be made into those topics on which particularly questioning
and answering are employed. For what is the end proposed in reasoning?
To establish true propositions, to remove the false, to withhold
assent from those which are not plain. Is it enough then to have
learned only this? "It is enough," a man may reply. Is it, then,
also enough for a man, who would not make a mistake in the use of
coined money, to have heard this precept, that he should receive the
genuine drachmae and reject the spurious? "It is not enough." What,
then, ought to be added to this precept? What else than the faculty
which proves and distinguishes the genuine and the spurious
drachmae? Consequently also in reasoning what has been said is not
enough; but is it necessary that a man should acquire the faculty of
examining and distinguishing the true and the false, and that which is
not plain? "It is necessary." Besides this, what is proposed in
reasoning? "That you should accept what follows from that which you
have properly granted." Well, is it then enough in this case also to
know this? It is not enough; but a man must learn how one thing is a
consequence of other things, and when one thing follows from one
thing, and when it follows from several collectively. Consider, then
if it be not necessary that this power should also be acquired by
him who purposes to conduct himself skillfully in reasoning, the power
of demonstrating himself the several things which he has proposed, and
the power of understanding the demonstrations of others, including
of not being deceived by sophists, as if they were demonstrating.
Therefore there has arisen among us the practice and exercise of
conclusive arguments and figures, and it has been shown to be
necessary.

But in fact in some cases we have properly granted the premisses
or assumptions, and there results from them something; and though it
is not true, yet none the less it does result. What then ought I to
do? Ought I to admit the falsehood? And how is that possible? Well,
should I say that I did not properly grant that which we agreed
upon? "But you are not allowed to do even this." Shall I then say that
the consequence does not arise through what has been conceded? "But
neither is it allowed." What then must be done in this case?
Consider if it is not this: as to have borrowed is not enough to
make a man still a debtor, but to this must be added the fact that
he continues to owe the money and that the debt is not paid, so it
is not enough to compel you to admit the inference that you have