"Discourses" - читать интересную книгу автора (Epictetus)

we do not the acts which follow from such opinions; and as to thinking
or not thinking, that is in our power and not in externals. "It is
so," he said. From this day then we shall inquire into and examine
nothing else, what its quality is, or its state, neither land nor
slaves nor horses nor dogs, nothing else than opinions. "I hope so."
You see, then, that you must become a Scholasticus, an animal whom all
ridicule, if you really intend to make an examination of your own
opinions: and that this is not the work of one hour or day, you know
yourself.

CHAPTER 12

Of contentment

With respect to gods, there are some who say that a divine being
does not exist: others say that it exists, but is inactive and
careless, and takes no forethought about anything; a third class say
that such a being exists and exercises forethought, but only about
great things and heavenly things, and about nothing on the earth; a
fourth class say that a divine being exercises forethought both
about things on the earth and heavenly things, but in a general way
only, and not about things severally. There is a fifth class to whom
Ulysses and Socrates belong, who say: "I move not without thy
knowledge."

Before all other things, then, it is necessary to inquire about each
of these opinions, whether it is affirmed truly or not truly. For if
there are no gods, how is it our proper end to follow them? And if
they exist, but take no care of anything, in this case also how will
it be right to follow them? But if indeed they do exist and look after
things, still if there is nothing communicated from them to men, nor
in fact to myself, how even so is it right? The wise and good man,
then, after considering all these things, submits his own mind to
him who administers the whole, as good citizens do to the law of the
state. He who is receiving instruction ought to come to the instructed
with this intention: How shall I follow the gods in all things, how
shall I be contented with the divine administration, and how can I
become free?" For he is free to whom everything happens according,
to his will, and whom no man can hinder. "What then, is freedom
madness?" Certainly not: for madness and freedom do not consist.
"But," you say, "I would have everything result just as I like, and in
whatever way I like." You are mad, you are beside yourself. Do you not
know that freedom is a noble and valuable thing? But for me
inconsiderately to wish for things to happen as I inconsiderately
like, this appears to be not only not noble, but even most base. For
how do we proceed in the matter of writing? Do I wish to write the
name of Dion as I choose? No, but I am taught to choose to write it as
it ought to be written. And how with respect to music? In the same
manner. And what universally in every art or science? Just the same.
If it were not so, it would be of no value to know anything, if