"Discourses" - читать интересную книгу автора (Epictetus)

and on behalf of all to sing the hymn to God? For what else can I
do, a lame old man, than sing hymns to God? If then I was a
nightingale, I would do the part of a nightingale: if I were a swan, I
would do like a swan. But now I am a rational creature, and I ought to
praise God: this is my work; I do it, nor will I desert this post,
so long as I am allowed to keep it; and I exhort you to join in this
same song.

CHAPTER 17

That the logical art is necessary

Since reason is the faculty which analyses and perfects the rest,
and it ought itself not to be unanalysed, by what should it be
analysed? for it is plain that this should be done either by itself or
by another thing. Either, then, this other thing also is reason, or
something else superior to reason; which is impossible. But if it is
reason, again who shall analyse that reason? For if that reason does
this for itself, our reason also can do it. But we shall require
something else, the thing, will go on to infinity and have no end.
Reason therefore is analysed by itself. "Yes: but it is more urgent to
cure (our opinions) and the like." Will you then hear about those
things? Hear. But if you should say, "I know not whether you are
arguing truly or falsely," and if I should express myself in any way
ambiguously, and you should say to me, " Distinguish," I will bear
with you no longer, and I shall say to "It is more urgent." This is
the reason, I suppose, why they place the logical art first, as in the
measuring of corn we place first the examination of the measure. But
if we do not determine first what is a modius, and what is a
balance, how shall we be able to measure or weigh anything?

In this case, then, if we have not fully learned and accurately
examined the criterion of all other things, by which the other
things are learned, shall we be able to examine accurately and to
learn fully anything else? "Yes; but the modius is only wood, and a
thing which produces no fruit." But it is a thing which can measure
corn. "Logic also produces no fruit." As to this indeed we shall
see: but then even if a man should rant this, it is enough that
logic has the power of distinguishing and examining other things, and,
as we may say, of measuring and weighing them. Who says this? Is it
only Chrysippus, and Zeno, and Cleanthes? And does not Antisthenes say
so? And who is it that has written that the examination of names is
the beginning of education? And does not Socrates say so? And of
whom does Xenophon write, that he began with the examination of names,
what each name signified? Is this then the great and wondrous thing to
understand or interpret Chrysippus? Who says this? What then is the
wondrous thing? To understand the will of nature. Well then do you
apprehend it yourself by your own power? and what more have you need
of? For if it is true that all men err involuntarily, and you have
learned the truth, of necessity you must act right. "But in truth I do