"Discourses" - читать интересную книгу автора (Epictetus)

to be admired? Are they not those of whom you are used to say that
they are mad? Well then do you wish to be admired by madmen?

CHAPTER 22

On precognitions

Precognitions are common to all men, and precognition is not
contradictory to precognition. For who of us does not assume that Good
is useful and eligible, and in all circumstances that we ought to
follow and pursue it? And who of us does not assume that justice is
beautiful and becoming? When, then, does the contradiction arise? It
arises in the adaptation of the precognitions to the particular cases.
When one man says, "He has done well: he is a brave man," and
another says, "Not so; but he has acted foolishly"; then the
disputes arise among men. This is the dispute among the Jews and the
Syrians and the Egyptians and the Romans; not whether holiness
should be preferred to all things and in all cases should be
pursued, but whether it is holy to eat pig's flesh or not holy. You
will find this dispute also between Agamemnon and Achilles; for call
them forth. What do you say, Agamemnon ought not that to be done which
is proper and right? "Certainly." Well, what do you say, Achilles?
do you not admit that what is good ought to be done? "I do most
certainly." Adapt your precognitions then to the present matter.
Here the dispute begins. Agamemnon says, "I ought not to give up
Chryseis to her father." Achilles says, "You ought." It is certain
that one of the two makes a wrong adaptation of the precognition of
ought" or "duty." Further, Agamemnon says, "Then if I ought to restore
Chryseis, it is fit that I take his prize from some of you."
Achilles replies, "Would you then take her whom I love?" "Yes, her
whom you love." "Must I then be the only man who goes without a prize?
and must I be the only man who has no prize?" Thus the dispute begins.

What then is education? Education is the learning how to adapt the
natural precognitions to the particular things conformably to
nature; and then to distinguish that of things some are in our
power, but others are not; in our power are will and all acts which
depend on the will; things not in our power are the body, the parts of
the body, possessions, parents, brothers, children, country, and,
generally, all with whom we live in society. In what, then, should
we place the good? To what kind of things shall we adapt it? "To the
things which are in our power?" Is not health then a good thing, and
soundness of limb, and life? and are not children and parents and
country? Who will tolerate you if you deny this?

Let us then transfer the notion of good to these things. is it
possible, then, when a man sustains damage and does not obtain good
things, that he can be happy? "It is not possible." And can he
maintain toward society a proper behavior? He cannot. For I am
naturally formed to look after my own interest. If it is my interest