"Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion" - читать интересную книгу автора (Hume David)

arguments for God's existence, particularly Leibniz's
cosmological argument:

(a) The world contains an infinite sequence of contingent

facts;

(b) An explanation is needed as to the origin of this whole

infinite series, which goes beyond an explanation of each

member in the series;

(c) The explanation of this whole series cannot reside in

the series itself, since the very fact of its existence

would still need an explanation (principle of sufficient

reason)

(d) Therefore, there is a necessary substance which produced

this infinite series, and which is the complete explanation

of its own existence as well.

Earlier defenders of cosmological-type arguments, such as
Aquinas, argued that an infinite series of causes of the universe
is impossible. Thus, a first divine cause is required to start
this series of individual causes. However, Demea (and Leibniz)
assume that an infinite series of causes of the universe is
possible. Even so, Demea argues, we still need an explanation of
the entire collection of finite causes, which must be found
outside of the infinite collection of individual causes.

Finally, a character named Philo is a skeptic who argues
against both a posteriori and a priori proofs. Philo offers a
stream of criticisms against the design argument, many of which
are now standard in discussions of the issue. For Philo, the
design argument is based on a faulty analogy: we don't know
whether the order in nature was the result of design since,
unlike our experience with the creation of machines, we did not
witness the formation of the world. The vastness of the universe
also weakens any comparison with a human artifacts: although the
universe is orderly here, it may be chaotic elsewhere. Similarly,
if intelligent design is exhibited only in a small fraction of
the universe, then we can not say it is the productive force of
the whole universe. Philo also contends that natural design may
be accounted for by nature alone, insofar as matter contains