"Essays on Suicide and the Immortality of the Soul" - читать интересную книгу автора (Hume David)

most express terms. 'Tis providence surely that has placed me at
this present in this chamber: But may I not leave it when I think
proper, without being liable to the imputation of having deserted my
post or station? When I shall be dead, the principles of {17} which
I am composed will still perform their part in the universe, and
will be equally useful in the grand fabrick, as when they composed
this individual creature. The difference to the whole will be no
greater than betwixt my being in a chamber and in the open air. The
one change is of more importance to me than the other; but not more
so to the universe.

-- 'T/IS\ a kind of blasphemy to imagine that any created being
can disturb the order of the world, or invade the business of
Providence! It supposes, that that being possesses powers and
faculties, which it received not from its creator, and which are not
subordinate to his government and authority. A man may disturb
society no doubt, and thereby incur the displeasure of the Almighty:
But the government of the world is placed far beyond his reach and
violence. And how does it appear that the Almighty is displeased
with those actions that disturb society? By the principles {18}
which he has implanted in human nature, and which inspire us with a
sentiment of remorse if we ourselves have been guilty of such
actions, and with that of blame and disapprobation, if we ever
observe them in others: -- Let us now examine, according to the
method proposed, whether Suicide be of this kind of actions, and be
a breach of our duty to our and to .

A /MAN\ who retires from life does no harm to society: He only
ceases to do good; which, if it is an injury, is of the lowest kind.
-- All our obligations to do good to society seem to imply something
reciprocal. I receive the benefits of society, and therefore ought
to promote its interests; but when I withdraw myself altogether from
society, can I be bound any longer? But allowing that our
obligations to do good were perpetual, they have certainly some
bounds; I am not obliged to do a small good to society at the
expence of a {19} great harm to myself; why then should I prolong a
miserable existence, because of some frivolous advantage which the
public may perhaps receive from me? If upon account of age and
infirmities, I may lawfully resign any office, and employ my time
altogether in fencing against these calamities, and alleviating, as
much as possible, the miseries of my future life: why may I not cut
short these miseries at once by an action which is no more
prejudicial to society? -- But suppose that it is no longer in my
power to promote the interest of society, suppose that I am a burden
to it, suppose that my life hinders some person from being much more
useful to society. In such cases, my resignation of life must not
only be innocent, but laudable. And most people who lie under any
temptation to abandon existence, are in some such situation; those
who have health, or power, or authority, have commonly better reason
to be in humour with the world. ([editor's note] 4) {20}