"Of the Standard of Taste" - читать интересную книгу автора (Hume David)

besides those of applause and approbation. But would we know,
whether the pretended prophet had really attained a just
sentiment of morals? Let us attend to his narration; and we
shall soon find, that he bestows praise on such instances of
treachery, inhumanity, cruelty, revenge, bigotry, as are
utterly incompatible with civilized society. No steady rule of
right seems there to be attended to; and every action is
blamed or praised, so far only as it is beneficial or hurtful
to the true believers.

The merit of delivering true general precepts in ethics is
indeed very small. Whoever recommends any moral virtues,
really does no more than is implied in the terms themselves.
That people, who invented the word charity, and use it in a
good sense, inculcated more clearly and much more
efficaciously, the precept, be charitable, than any pretended
legislator or prophet, who should insert such a maxim in his
writings. Of all expressions, those, which, together with
their other meaning, imply a degree either of blame or
approbation, are the least liable to be perverted or mistaken.

It is natural for us to seek a Standard of Taste; a rule, by
which the various sentiments of men may be reconciled; at
least, a decision, afforded, confirming one sentiment, and
condemning another.

There is a species of philosophy, which cuts off all hopes of
success in such an attempt, and represents the impossibility
of ever attaining any standard of taste. The difference, it is
said, is very wide between judgment and sentiment. All
sentiment is right; because sentiment has a reference to
nothing beyond itself, and is always real, wherever a man is
conscious of it. But all determinations of the understanding
are not right; because they have a reference to something
beyond themselves, to wit, real matter of fact; and are not
always conformable to that standard. Among a thousand
different opinions which different men may entertain of the
same subject, there is one, and but one, that is just and
true; and the only difficulty is to fix and ascertain it. On
the contrary, a thousand different sentiments, excited by the
same object, are all right: Because no sentiment represents
what is really in the object. It only marks a certain
conformity or relation between the object and the organs or
faculties of the mind; and if that conformity did not really
exist, the sentiment could never possibly have being. Beauty
is no quality in things themselves: It exists merely in the
mind which contemplates them; and each mind perceives a
different beauty. One person may even perceive deformity,
where another is sensible of beauty; and every individual
ought to acquiesce in his own sentiment, without pretending to