expression of aesthetic ideas,31 and these he characterizes as
follows:
"... that representation of the imagination which induces much
thought, yet without the possibility of any definite thought
whatever, i.e., concept, being adequate to it, and which language,
consequently, can never get on level terms with or render
completely intelligible."32
He also explicitly understands the beauty of nature as the
expression of aesthetic ideas, i.e., as inducing much thought,
without the possibility of any definite thought or concept being
adequate to it. Apparently it will be relevant for the beauty of a
specific object of nature under what description the object is
perceived. And the involved concepts will 'guide' the proposals
done by the understanding within the free play, et cetera. So it
seems appropriate to attribute to Kant the idea that all
judgements of taste are dependent upon the concepts stored into
the subject term of the judgement of taste. This, then, would not
merely apply to complex works of art.
My characterization of the free play of the cognitive faculties as
a dialogue, rather than a harmony, between understanding (which at
the request of imagination furnishes determinate concepts) and the
imagination (which denies these concepts their application)
clearly fits the notion of aesthetic ideas. Typically, this
accords with Wiggins' account as well: the
