"Utilitarianism" - читать интересную книгу автора (Mill John Stuart)

sources of physical and mental suffering- such as indigence, disease,
and the unkindness, worthlessness, or premature loss of objects of
affection. The main stress of the problem lies, therefore, in the
contest with these calamities, from which it is a rare good fortune
entirely to escape; which, as things now are, cannot be obviated,
and often cannot be in any material degree mitigated. Yet no one whose
opinion deserves a moment's consideration can doubt that most of the
great positive evils of the world are in themselves removable, and
will, if human affairs continue to improve, be in the end reduced
within narrow limits. Poverty, in any sense implying suffering, may be
completely extinguished by the wisdom of society, combined with the
good sense and providence of individuals. Even that most intractable
of enemies, disease, may be indefinitely reduced in dimensions by good
physical and moral education, and proper control of noxious
influences; while the progress of science holds out a promise for
the future of still more direct conquests over this detestable foe.
And every advance in that direction relieves us from some, not only of
the chances which cut short our own lives, but, what concerns us still
more, which deprive us of those in whom our happiness is wrapt up.
As for vicissitudes of fortune, and other disappointments connected
with worldly circumstances, these are principally the effect either of
gross imprudence, of ill-regulated desires, or of bad or imperfect
social institutions.

All the grand sources, in short, of human suffering are in a great
degree, many of them almost entirely, conquerable by human care and
effort; and though their removal is grievously slow- though a long
succession of generations will perish in the breach before the
conquest is completed, and this world becomes all that, if will and
knowledge were not wanting, it might easily be made- yet every mind
sufficiently intelligent and generous to bear a part, however small
and unconspicuous, in the endeavour, will draw a noble enjoyment
from the contest itself, which he would not for any bribe in the
form of selfish indulgence consent to be without.

And this leads to the true estimation of what is said by the
objectors concerning the possibility, and the obligation, of
learning to do without happiness. Unquestionably it is possible to
do without happiness; it is done involuntarily by
nineteen-twentieths of mankind, even in those parts of our present
world which are least deep in barbarism; and it often has to be done
voluntarily by the hero or the martyr, for the sake of something which
he prizes more than his individual happiness. But this something, what
is it, unless the happiness of others or some of the requisites of
happiness? It is noble to be capable of resigning entirely one's own
portion of happiness, or chances of it: but, after all, this
self-sacrifice must be for some end; it is not its own end; and if
we are told that its end is not happiness, but virtue, which is better
than happiness, I ask, would the sacrifice be made if the hero or
martyr did not believe that it would earn for others immunity from