"Utilitarianism" - читать интересную книгу автора (Mill John Stuart)

But to speak only of actions done from the motive of duty, and in
direct obedience to principle: it is a misapprehension of the
utilitarian mode of thought, to conceive it as implying that people
should fix their minds upon so wide a generality as the world, or
society at large. The great majority of good actions are intended
not for the benefit of the world, but for that of individuals, of
which the good of the world is made up; and the thoughts of the most
virtuous man need not on these occasions travel beyond the
particular persons concerned, except so far as is necessary to
assure himself that in benefiting them he is not violating the rights,
that is, the legitimate and authorised expectations, of any one
else. The multiplication of happiness is, according to the utilitarian
ethics, the object of virtue: the occasions on which any person
(except one in a thousand) has it in his power to do this on an
extended scale, in other words to be a public benefactor, are but
exceptional; and on these occasions alone is he called on to
consider public utility; in every other case, private utility, the
interest or happiness of some few persons, is all he has to attend to.
Those alone the influence of whose actions extends to society in
general, need concern themselves habitually about large an object.
In the case of abstinences indeed- of things which people forbear to
do from moral considerations, though the consequences in the
particular case might be beneficial- it would be unworthy of an
intelligent agent not to be consciously aware that the action is of a
class which, if practised generally, would be generally injurious, and
that this is the ground of the obligation to abstain from it. The
amount of regard for the public interest implied in this recognition,
is no greater than is demanded by every system of morals, for they all
enjoin to abstain from whatever is manifestly pernicious to society.

The same considerations dispose of another reproach against the
doctrine of utility, founded on a still grosser misconception of the
purpose of a standard of morality, and of the very meaning of the
words right and wrong. It is often affirmed that utilitarianism
renders men cold and unsympathising; that it chills their moral
feelings towards individuals; that it makes them regard only the dry
and hard consideration of the consequences of actions, not taking into
their moral estimate the qualities from which those actions emanate.
If the assertion means that they do not allow their judgment
respecting the rightness or wrongness of an action to be influenced by
their opinion of the qualities of the person who does it, this is a
complaint not against utilitarianism, but against having any
standard of morality at all; for certainly no known ethical standard
decides an action to be good or bad because it is done by a good or
a bad man, still less because done by an amiable, a brave, or a
benevolent man, or the contrary. These considerations are relevant,
not to the estimation of actions, but of persons; and there is nothing
in the utilitarian theory inconsistent with the fact that there are
other things which interest us in persons besides the rightness and
wrongness of their actions. The Stoics, indeed, with the paradoxical