"Utilitarianism" - читать интересную книгу автора (Mill John Stuart)

misuse of language which was part of their system, and by which they
strove to raise themselves above all concern about anything but
virtue, were fond of saying that he who has that has everything;
that he, and only he, is rich, is beautiful, is a king. But no claim
of this description is made for the virtuous man by the utilitarian
doctrine. Utilitarians are quite aware that there are other
desirable possessions and qualities besides virtue, and are
perfectly willing to allow to all of them their full worth. They are
also aware that a right action does not necessarily indicate a
virtuous character, and that actions which are blamable, often proceed
from qualities entitled to praise. When this is apparent in any
particular case, it modifies their estimation, not certainly of the
act, but of the agent. I grant that they are, notwithstanding, of
opinion, that in the long run the best proof of a good character is
good actions; and resolutely refuse to consider any mental disposition
as good, of which the predominant tendency is to produce bad
conduct. This makes them unpopular with many people; but it is an
unpopularity which they must share with every one who regards the
distinction between right and wrong in a serious light; and the
reproach is not one which a conscientious utilitarian need be
anxious to repel.

If no more be meant by the objection than that many utilitarians
look on the morality of actions, as measured by the utilitarian
standard, with too exclusive a regard, and do not lay sufficient
stress upon the other beauties of character which go towards making
a human being lovable or admirable, this may be admitted. Utilitarians
who have cultivated their moral feelings, but not their sympathies nor
their artistic perceptions, do fall into this mistake; and so do all
other moralists under the same conditions. What can be said in
excuse for other moralists is equally available for them, namely,
that, if there is to be any error, it is better that it should be on
that side. As a matter of fact, we may affirm that among
utilitarians as among adherents of other systems, there is every
imaginable degree of rigidity and of laxity in the application of
their standard: some are even puritanically rigorous, while others are
as indulgent as can possibly be desired by sinner or by
sentimentalist. But on the whole, a doctrine which brings
prominently forward the interest that mankind have in the repression
and prevention of conduct which violates the moral law, is likely to
be inferior to no other in turning the sanctions of opinion again such
violations. It is true, the question, What does violate the moral law?
is one on which those who recognise different standards of morality
are likely now and then to differ. But difference of opinion on
moral questions was not first introduced into the world by
utilitarianism, while that doctrine does supply, if not always an
easy, at all events a tangible and intelligible mode of deciding
such differences.

It may not be superfluous to notice a few more of the common