"Utilitarianism" - читать интересную книгу автора (Mill John Stuart)

supposed moral standard- What is its sanction? what are the motives
to obey it? or more specifically, what is the source of its
obligation? whence does it derive its binding force? It is a necessary
part of moral philosophy to provide the answer to this question;
which, though frequently assuming the shape of an objection to the
utilitarian morality, as if it had some special applicability to
that above others, really arises in regard to all standards. It
arises, in fact, whenever a person is called on to adopt a standard,
or refer morality to any basis on which he has not been accustomed
to rest it. For the customary morality, that which education and
opinion have consecrated, is the only one which presents itself to the
mind with the feeling of being in itself obligatory; and when a person
is asked to believe that this morality derives its obligation from
some general principle round which custom has not thrown the same
halo, the assertion is to him a paradox; the supposed corollaries seem
to have a more binding force than the original theorem; the
superstructure seems to stand better without, than with, what is
represented as its foundation. He says to himself, I feel that I am
bound not to rob or murder, betray or deceive; but why am I bound to
promote the general happiness? If my own happiness lies in something
else, why may I not give that the preference?

If the view adopted by the utilitarian philosophy of the nature of
the moral sense be correct, this difficulty will always present
itself, until the influences which form moral character have taken the
same hold of the principle which they have taken of some of the
consequences- until, by the improvement of education, the feeling of
unity with our fellow-creatures shall be (what it cannot be denied
that Christ intended it to be) as deeply rooted in our character,
and to our own consciousness as completely a part of our nature, as
the horror of crime is in an ordinarily well brought up young
person. In the meantime, however, the difficulty has no peculiar
application to the doctrine of utility, but is inherent in every
attempt to analyse morality and reduce it to principles; which, unless
the principle is already in men's minds invested with as much
sacredness as any of its applications, always seems to divest them
of a part of their sanctity.

The principle of utility either has, or there is no reason why it
might not have, all the sanctions which belong to any other system
of morals. Those sanctions are either external or internal. Of the
external sanctions it is not necessary to speak at any length. They
are, the hope of favour and the fear of displeasure, from our fellow
creatures or from the Ruler of the Universe, along with whatever we
may have of sympathy or affection for them, or of love and awe of Him,
inclining us to do his will independently of selfish consequences.
There is evidently no reason why all these motives for observance
should not attach themselves to the utilitarian morality, as
completely and as powerfully as to any other. Indeed, those of them
which refer to our fellow creatures are sure to do so, in proportion