"Utilitarianism" - читать интересную книгу автора (Mill John Stuart)

on those who do not possess the feelings it appeals to; but neither
will these persons be more obedient to any other moral principle
than to the utilitarian one. On them morality of any kind has no
hold but through the external sanctions. Meanwhile the feelings exist,
a fact in human nature, the reality of which, and the great power with
which they are capable of acting on those in whom they have been
duly cultivated, are proved by experience. No reason has ever been
shown why they may not be cultivated to as great intensity in
connection with the utilitarian, as with any other rule of morals.

There is, I am aware, a disposition to believe that a person who
sees in moral obligation a transcendental fact, an objective reality
belonging to the province of "Things in themselves," is likely to be
more obedient to it than one who believes it to be entirely
subjective, having its seat in human consciousness only. But
whatever a person's opinion may be on this point of Ontology, the
force he is really urged by is his own subjective feeling, and is
exactly measured by its strength. No one's belief that duty is an
objective reality is stronger than the belief that God is so; yet
the belief in God, apart from the expectation of actual reward and
punishment, only operates on conduct through, and in proportion to,
the subjective religious feeling. The sanction, so far as it is
disinterested, is always in the mind itself; and the notion
therefore of the transcendental moralists must be, that this
sanction will not exist in the mind unless it is believed to have
its root out of the mind; and that if a person is able to say to
himself, This which is restraining me, and which is called my
conscience, is only a feeling in my own mind, he may possibly draw the
conclusion that when the feeling ceases the obligation ceases, and
that if he find the feeling inconvenient, he may disregard it, and
endeavour to get rid of it. But is this danger confined to the
utilitarian morality? Does the belief that moral obligation has its
seat outside the mind make the feeling of it too strong to be got
rid of? The fact is so far otherwise, that all moralists admit and
lament the ease with which, in the generality of minds, conscience can
be silenced or stifled. The question, Need I obey my conscience? is
quite as often put to themselves by persons who never heard of the
principle of utility, as by its adherents. Those whose conscientious
feelings are so weak as to allow of their asking this question, if
they answer it affirmatively, will not do so because they believe in
the transcendental theory, but because of the external sanctions.

It is not necessary, for the present purpose, to decide whether
the feeling of duty is innate or implanted. Assuming it to be
innate, it is an open question to what objects it naturally attaches
itself; for the philosophic supporters of that theory are now agreed
that the intuitive perception is of principles of morality and not
of the details. If there be anything innate in the matter, I see no
reason why the feeling which is innate should not be that of regard to
the pleasures and pains of others. If there is any principle of morals