"meno" - читать интересную книгу автора (Plato)

intemperate and unjust?

Men. They cannot.

Soc. They must be temperate and just?

Men. Yes.

Soc. Then all men are good in the same way, and by participation
in the same virtues?

Men. Such is the inference.

Soc. And they surely would not have been good in the same way,
unless their virtue had been the same?

Men. They would not.

Soc. Then now that the sameness of all virtue has been proven, try
and remember what you and Gorgias say that virtue is.

Men. Will you have one definition of them all?

Soc. That is what I am seeking.

Men. If you want to have one definition of them all, I know not what
to say, but that virtue is the power of governing mankind.

Soc. And does this definition of virtue include all virtue? Is
virtue the same in a child and in a slave, Meno? Can the child
govern his father, or the slave his master; and would he who
governed be any longer a slave?

Men. I think not, Socrates.

Soc. No, indeed; there would be small reason in that. Yet once more,
fair friend; according to you, virtue is "the power of governing"; but
do you not add "justly and not unjustly"?

Men. Yes, Socrates; I agree there; for justice is virtue.

Soc. Would you say "virtue," Meno, or "a virtue"?

Men. What do you mean?

Soc. I mean as I might say about anything; that a round, for
example, is "a figure" and not simply "figure," and I should adopt
this mode of speaking, because there are other figures.

Men. Quite right; and that is just what I am saying about