"Six Enneads" - читать интересную книгу автора (Plotinus)

only reason allows- that all the affections and experiences really
have their seat in the Soul, and with the affections every state and
mood, good and bad alike.

But if Soul [in man] and Essential Soul are one and the same, then
the Soul will be an Ideal-Form unreceptive of all those activities
which it imparts to another Kind but possessing within itself that
native Act of its own which Reason manifests.

If this be so, then, indeed, we may think of the Soul as an
immortal- if the immortal, the imperishable, must be impassive, giving
out something of itself but itself taking nothing from without
except for what it receives from the Existents prior to itself from
which Existents, in that they are the nobler, it cannot be sundered.

Now what could bring fear to a nature thus unreceptive of all
the outer? Fear demands feeling. Nor is there place for courage:
courage implies the presence of danger. And such desires as are
satisfied by the filling or voiding of the body, must be proper to
something very different from the Soul, to that only which admits of
replenishment and voidance.

And how could the Soul lend itself to any admixture? An
essential is not mixed. Or of the intrusion of anything alien? If it
did, it would be seeking the destruction of its own nature. Pain
must be equally far from it. And Grief- how or for what could it
grieve? Whatever possesses Existence is supremely free, dwelling,
unchangeable, within its own peculiar nature. And can any increase
bring joy, where nothing, not even anything good, can accrue? What
such an Existent is, it is unchangeably.

Thus assuredly Sense-Perception, Discursive-Reasoning; and all our
ordinary mentation are foreign to the Soul: for sensation is a
receiving- whether of an Ideal-Form or of an impassive body- and
reasoning and all ordinary mental action deal with sensation.

The question still remains to be examined in the matter of the
intellections- whether these are to be assigned to the Soul- and as to
Pure-Pleasure, whether this belongs to the Soul in its solitary state.

3. We may treat of the Soul as in the body- whether it be set
above it or actually within it- since the association of the two
constitutes the one thing called the living organism, the Animate.

Now from this relation, from the Soul using the body as an
instrument, it does not follow that the Soul must share the body's
experiences: a man does not himself feel all the experiences of the
tools with which he is working.

It may be objected that the Soul must however, have