"Рэймонд Смаллиан. Две философские сценки (англ.)" - читать интересную книгу автора

sworn that the book seemed red to me; it sure seems that it seems read to
me!
EPISTEMOLOGIST: I'm sorry, but you are wrong again.
FRANK: Really? It doesn't even seem that it seems red to me? It sure
seems like it seems like it seems red to me!
EPISTEMOLOGIST: Wrong again! And no matter how many times you reiterate
the phrase "it seems like" and follow it by "the book is red" you will be
wrong.
FRANK: This is fantastic! Suppose instead of the phrase "it seems like"
I would say "I believe that." So let us start again at ground level. I
retract the statement "It seems red to me" and instead I assert "I believe
that this book is red." Is this statement true or false?
EPISTEMOLOGIST: Just a moment while I scan the dials of the
brain-reading machine--no, the statement is false.
FRANK: And what about "I believe that I believe that the book is red"?
EPISTEMOLOGIST (consulting his dials): Also false. And again, no matter
how many times you iterate "I believe," all these belief sentences are
false.
FRANK: Well, this has been a most enlightening experience. However, you
must admit that it is a little hard on me to realize that I am entertaining
infinitely many erroneous beliefs!
EPISTEMOLOGIST: Why do you say that your beliefs are erroneous?
FRANK: But you have been telling me this all the while!
EPISTEMOLOGIST: I most certainly have not!
FRANK: Good God, I was prepared to admit all my errors, and now you
tell me that my beliefs are not errors; what are you trying to do, drive me
crazy?
EPISTEMOLOGIST: Hey, take it easy! Please try to recall: When did I say
or imply that any of your beliefs are erroneous?
FRANK: Just simply recall the infinite sequence of sentences: (1) I
believe this book is red; (2) I believe that I believe this book is red; and
so forth. You told me that every one of those statements is false.
EPISTEMOLOGIST: True.
FRANK: Then how can you consistently maintain that my beliefs in all
these false statements are not erroneous?
EPISTEMOLOGIST: Because, as I told you, you don't believe any of them.
FRANK: I think I see, yet I am not absolutely sure.
EPISTEMOLOGIST: Look, let me put it another way. Don't you see that the
very falsity of each of the statements that you assert saves you from an
erroneous belief in the preceding one? The first statement is, as I told
you, false. Very well! Now the second statement is simply to the effect that
you believe the first statement. If the second statement were true, then you
would believe the first statement, and hence your belief about the first
statement would indeed be in error. But fortunately the second statement is
false, hence you don't really believe the first statement, so your belief in
the first statement is not in error. Thus the falsity of the second
statement implies you do not have an erroneous belief about the first; the
falsity of the third likewise saves you from an erroneous belief about the
second, etc.
FRANK: Now I see perfectly! So none of my beliefs were erroneous, only