"Three Dialogues" - читать интересную книгу автора (Berkeley George)

by sense>. You will farther inform me, whether we immediately
perceive by sight anything beside light, and colours, and
figures; or by hearing, anything but sounds; by the palate,
anything beside tastes; by the smell, beside odours; or by the
touch, more than tangible qualities.

. We do not.

. It seems, therefore, that if you take away all
sensible qualities, there remains nothing sensible?

. I grant it.

. Sensible things therefore are {250} nothing else but
so many sensible qualities, or combinations of sensible
qualities?

. Nothing else.

. then is a sensible thing?

. Certainly.

. Doth the of sensible things consist in
being perceived? or, is it something distinct from their being

perceived, and that bears no relation to the mind?

. To is one thing, and to be is
another.

. I speak with regard to sensible things only. And of
these I ask, whether by their real existence you mean a
subsistence exterior to the mind, and distinct from their being
perceived?

. I mean a real absolute being, distinct from, and
without any relation to, their being perceived.

. Heat therefore, if it be allowed a real being, must
exist without the mind?

. It must.

. Tell me, Hylas, is this real existence equally
compatible to all degrees of heat, which we perceive; or is there
any reason why we should attribute it to some, and deny it to
others? And if there be, pray let me know that reason.

. Whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense, we may
be sure the same exists in the object that occasions it.

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