"Three Dialogues" - читать интересную книгу автора (Berkeley George)


. What! the greatest as well as the least?

. tell you, the reason is plainly the same in
respect of both. They are both perceived by sense; nay, the
greater degree of heat is more sensibly perceived; and
consequently, if there is {176} any difference, we are more
certain of its real existence than we can be of the reality of a
lesser degree.

. But is not the most vehement and intense degree of
heat a very great pain?

. No one can deny it.

. And is any unperceiving thing capable of pain or
pleasure?

. No, certainly.

. Is your material substance a senseless being, or a
being endowed with sense and perception?

. It is senseless without doubt.

. It cannot therefore be the subject of pain?

. By no means.

. Nor consequently of the greatest heat perceived by
sense, since you acknowledge this to be no small pain?

. I grant it.

. What shall we say then of your external object; is
it a material Substance, or no?

. It is a material substance with the sensible
qualities inhering in it.

. How then can a great heat exist in it, since you own
it cannot in a material substance? I desire you would clear this
point.

. Hold, Philonous, I fear I was out in yielding intense
heat to be a pain. It should seem rather, that pain is something
distinct from heat, and the consequence or effect of it.

. Upon putting your hand near the fire, do you
perceive one simple uniform sensation, or two distinct