"Three Dialogues" - читать интересную книгу автора (Berkeley George)

sensations?

. But one simple sensation.

. Is not the heat immediately perceived?,

. It is.

. And the pain?

. True.

. Seeing therefore they are both immediately perceived
at the same time, and the fire affects you only with one simple
or uncompounded idea, it follows that this same simple idea is
both the intense heat immediately perceived, and the pain; and,
consequently, that the intense heat immediately perceived is
nothing distinct from a particular sort of pain.

. It seems so.

. Again, try in your thoughts, Hylas, if you can
conceive a vehement sensation to be without pain or pleasure.
{177}

. I cannot.

. Or can you frame to yourself an idea of sensible
pain or pleasure in general, abstracted from every particular
idea of heat, cold, tastes, smells? &c.

. I do not find that I can.

. Doth it not therefore follow, that sensible pain is
nothing distinct from those sensations or ideas, in an intense
degree?

. It is undeniable; and, to speak the truth, I begin to
suspect a very great heat cannot exist but in a mind perceiving
it.

. What! are you then in that sceptical state of
suspense, between affirming and denying?

. I think I may be positive in the point. A very
violent and painful heat cannot exist without the mind.

. It hath not therefore according to you, any
being?