"Discourses" - читать интересную книгу автора (Epictetus)

granted the premisses, but you must abide by what you have granted.
Indeed, if the premisses continue to the end such as they were when
they were granted, it is absolutely necessary for us to abide by
what we have granted, and we must accept their consequences: but if
the premisses do not remain such as they were when they were
granted, it is absolutely necessary for us also to withdraw from
what we granted, and from accepting what does not follow from the
words in which our concessions were made. For the inference is now not
our inference, nor does it result with our assent, since we have
withdrawn from the premisses which we granted. We ought then both to
examine such kind of premisses, and such change and variation of them,
by which in the course of questioning or answering, or in making the
syllogistic conclusion, or in any other such way, the premisses
undergo variations, and give occasion to the foolish to be confounded,
if they do not see what conclusions are. For what reason ought we to
examine? In order that we may not in this matter be employed in an
improper manner nor in a confused way.

And the same in hypotheses and hypothetical arguments; for it is
necessary sometimes to demand the granting of some hypothesis as a
kind of passage to the argument which follows. Must we then allow
every hypothesis that is proposed, or not allow every one? And if
not every one, which should we allow? And if a man has allowed an
hypothesis, must he in every case abide by allowing it? or must he
sometimes withdraw from it, but admit the consequences and not admit
contradictions? Yes; but suppose that a man says, "If you admit the
hypothesis of a possibility, I will draw you to an impossibility."
With such a person shall a man of sense refuse to enter into a
contest, and avoid discussion and conversation with him? But what
other man than the man of sense can use argumentation and is
skillful in questioning and answering, and incapable of being
cheated and deceived by false reasoning? And shall he enter into the
contest, and yet not take care whether he shall engage in argument not
rashly and not carelessly? And if he does not take care, how can he be
such a man as we conceive him to be? But without some such exercise
and preparation, can he maintain a continuous and consistent argument?
Let them show this; and all these speculations become superfluous, and
are absurd and inconsistent with our notion of a good and serious man.

Why are we still indolent and negligent and sluggish, and why do
we seek pretences for not labouring and not being watchful in
cultivating our reason? "If then I shall make a mistake in these
matters may I not have killed my father?" Slave, where was there a
father in this matter that you could kill him? What, then, have you
done? The only fault that was possible here is the fault which you
have committed. This is the very remark which I made to Rufus when
he blamed me for not having discovered the one thing omitted in a
certain syllogism: "I suppose," I said, "that I have burnt the
Capitol." "Slave," he replied, "was the thing omitted here the
Capitol?" Or are these the only crimes, to burn the Capitol and to