"A Letter" - читать интересную книгу автора (Hume David)


You see, Dear Sir, that I have concealed no Part of the
Accusation, but have inserted the Specimen and Charge, as
transmitted to me, without the smallest Variation. I shall now
go regularly thro' what is called the Sum of the Charge,
because it {19} is intended, I suppose, to contain the
Substance of the whole; and shall take Notice of the Specimen
as I go along.

1st, As to the Scepticism with which the Author is charged, I
must observe, that the Doctrine of the Pyrrhonians or
Scepticks have been regarded in all Ages as Principles of mere
Curiosity, or a Kind of Feux d' esprit, without any Influence
on a Man's steady Principles or Conduct in Life. In Reality, a
Philosopher who affects to doubt of the Maxims of common
Reason, and even of his Senses, declares sufficiently that he
is not in earnest, and that he intends not to advance an
Opinion which he would recommend as Standards of Judgment and
Action. All he means by these Scruples is to abate the Pride
of mere human Reasoners, by showing them, that even with
regard to Principles which seem the clearest, and which they
are necessitated from the strongest Instincts of Nature to
embrace, they are not able to attain a full Consistence and
absolute Certainty. Modesty then, and Humility, with regard to
the Operations of our natural Faculties, is the Result of
Scepticism; not an universal Doubt, which it is impossible for
any Man to support, and which the first and most trivial
Accident in Life must immediately disconcert and destroy. {20}

How is such a Frame of Mind prejudicial to Piety? And must not
a Man be ridiculous to assert that our Author denies the
Principles of Religion, when he looks upon them as equally
certain with the Objects of his Senses? If I be as much
assured of these Principles, as that this Table at which I now
write is before me; Can any Thing further be desired by the
most rigorous Antagonist? 'Tis evident, that so extravagant a
Doubt as that which Scepticism may seem to recommend, by
destroying every Thing, really affects nothing, and was never
intended to be understood seriously, but was meant as a mere
Philosophical Amusement, or Trial of Wit and Subtility.

This is a Construction suggested by the very Nature of the
Subject; but he has not been contented with that, but
expressly declared it. And all those Principles, cited in the
Specimen as Proofs of his Scepticism, are positively renounced
in a few Pages afterwards, and called the Effects of
Philosophical Melancholy and Delusion. These are his very
Words; and his Accuser's overlooking them may be thought very
prudent, but is a Degree of Unfairness which appears to me
altogether astonishing.