"Monadology" - читать интересную книгу автора (Leibniz Gottfried Wilhelm)

would be indistinguishable from one another, since they do not
differ in quantity. Consequently, space being a plenum, each part of
space would always receive, in any motion, exactly the equivalent of
what it already had, and no one state of things would be discernible
from another.

9. Indeed, each Monad must be different from every other. For in
nature there are never two beings which are perfectly alike and in
which it is not possible to find an internal difference, or at least a
difference founded upon an intrinsic quality [denomination].

10. I assume also as admitted that every created being, and
consequently the created Monad, is subject to change, and further that
this change is continuous in each.

11. It follows from what has just been said, that the natural
changes of the Monads come from an internal principle, since an
external cause can have no influence upon their inner being. (Theod.
396, 400.)

12. But, besides the principle of the change, there must be a
particular series of changes [un detail de ce qui change], which
constitutes, so to speak, the specific nature and variety of the
simple substances.

13. This particular series of changes should involve a
multiplicity in the unit [unite] or in that which is simple. For, as
every natural change takes place gradually, something changes and
something remains unchanged; and consequently a simple substance
must be affected and related in many ways, although it has no parts.

14. The passing condition, which involves and represents a
multiplicity in the unit [unite] or in the simple substance, is
nothing but what is called Perception, which is to be distinguished
from Apperception or Consciousness, as will afterwards appear. In this
matter the Cartesian view is extremely defective, for it treats as
non-existent those perceptions of which we are not consciously
aware. This has also led them to believe that minds [esprits] alone
are Monads, and that there are no souls of animals nor other
Entelechies. Thus, like the crowd, they have failed to distinguish
between a prolonged unconsciousness and absolute death, which has made
them fall again into the Scholastic prejudice of souls entirely
separate [from bodies], and has even confirmed ill-balanced minds in
the opinion that souls are mortal.

15. The activity of the internal principle which produces change
or passage from one perception to another may be called Appetition. It
is true that desire [l'appetit] cannot always fully attain to the
whole perception at which it aims, but it always obtains some of it
and attains to new perceptions.