"Monadology" - читать интересную книгу автора (Leibniz Gottfried Wilhelm)

16. We have in ourselves experience of a multiplicity in simple
substance, when we find that the least thought of which we are
conscious involves variety in its object. Thus all those who admit
that the soul is a simple substance should admit this multiplicity
in the Monad; and M. Bayle ought not to have found any difficulty in
this, as he has done in his Dictionary, article 'Rorarius.'

17. Moreover, it must be confessed that perception and that which
depends upon it are inexplicable on mechanical grounds, that is to
say, by means of figures and motions. And supposing there were a
machine, so constructed as to think, feel, and have perception, it
might be conceived as increased in size, while keeping the same
proportions, so that one might go into it as into a mill. That being
so, we should, on examining its interior, find only parts which work
one upon another, and never anything by which to explain a perception.
Thus it is in a simple substance, and not in a compound or in a
machine, that perception must be sought for. Further, nothing but this
(namely, perceptions and their changes) can be found in a simple
substance. It is also in this alone that all the internal activities
of simple substances can consist. (Theod. Pref. [E. 474; G. vi. 37].)

18. All simple substances or created Monads might be called
Entelechies, for they have in them a certain perfection (echousi to
enteles); they have a certain self-sufficiency (autarkeia) which makes
them the sources of their internal activities and, so to speak,
incorporeal automata. (Theod. 87.)

19. If we are to give the name of Soul to everything which has
perceptions and desires [appetits] in the general sense which I have
explained, then all simple substances or created Monads might be
called souls; but as feeling [le sentiment] is something more than a
bare perception, I think it right that the general name of Monads or
Entelechies should suffice for simple substances which have perception
only, and that the name of Souls should be given only to those in
which perception is more distinct, and is accompanied by memory.

20. For we experience in ourselves a condition in which we
remember nothing and have no distinguishable perception; as when we
fall into a swoon or when we are overcome with a profound dreamless
sleep. In this state the soul does not perceptibly differ from a
bare Monad; but as this state is not lasting, and the soul comes out
of it, the soul is something more than a bare Monad. (Theod. 64.)

21. And it does not follow that in this state the simple substance
is without any perception. That, indeed, cannot be, for the reasons
already given; for it cannot perish, and it cannot continue to exist
without being affected in some way, and this affection is nothing
but its perception. But when there is a great multitude of little
perceptions, in which there is nothing distinct, one is stunned; as