"meno" - читать интересную книгу автора (Plato)

Men. There are some who think that the evils will do them good,
and others who know that they will do them harm.

Soc. And, in your opinion, do those who think that they will do them
good know that they are evils?

Men. Certainly not.

Soc. Is it not obvious that those who are ignorant of their nature
do not desire them; but they desire what they suppose to be goods
although they are really evils; and if they are mistaken and suppose
the evils to be good they really desire goods?

Men. Yes, in that case.

Soc. Well, and do those who, as you say, desire evils, and think
that evils are hurtful to the possessor of them, know that they will
be hurt by them?

Men. They must know it.

Soc. And must they not suppose that those who are hurt are miserable
in proportion to the hurt which is inflicted upon them?

Men. How can it be otherwise?

Soc. But are not the miserable ill-fated?

Men. Yes, indeed.

Soc. And does any one desire to be miserable and ill-fated?

Men. I should say not, Socrates.

Soc. But if there is no one who desires to be miserable, there is no
one, Meno, who desires evil; for what is misery but the desire and
possession of evil?

Men. That appears to be the truth, Socrates, and I admit that nobody
desires evil.

Soc. And yet, were you not saying just now that virtue is the desire
and power of attaining good?

Men. Yes, I did say so.

Soc. But if this be affirmed, then the desire of good is common to
all, and one man is no better than another in that respect?

Men. True.