"meno" - читать интересную книгу автора (Plato)

Soc. And if one man is not better than another in desiring good,
he must be better in the power of attaining it?

Men. Exactly.

Soc. Then, according to your definition, virtue would appear to be
the power of attaining good?

Men. I entirely approve, Socrates, of the manner in which you now
view this matter.

Soc. Then let us see whether what you say is true from another point
of view; for very likely you may be right:-You affirm virtue to be the
power of attaining goods?

Men. Yes.

Soc. And the goods which mean are such as health and wealth and
the possession of gold and silver, and having office and honour in the
state-those are what you would call goods?

Men. Yes, I should include all those.

Soc. Then, according to Meno, who is the hereditary friend of the
great king, virtue is the power of getting silver and gold; and
would you add that they must be gained piously, justly, or do you deem
this to be of no consequence? And is any mode of acquisition, even
if unjust and dishonest, equally to be deemed virtue?

Men. Not virtue, Socrates, but vice.

Soc. Then justice or temperance or holiness, or some other part of
virtue, as would appear, must accompany the acquisition, and without
them the mere acquisition of good will not be virtue.

Men. Why, how can there be virtue without these?

Soc. And the non-acquisition of gold and silver in a dishonest
manner for oneself or another, or in other words the want of them, may
be equally virtue?

Men. True.

Soc. Then the acquisition of such goods is no more virtue than the
non-acquisition and want of them, but whatever is accompanied by
justice or honesty is virtue, and whatever is devoid of justice is
vice.

Men. It cannot be otherwise, in my judgment.