"Viktor Suvorov. Inside soviet military intelligence (англ) " - читать интересную книгу автора

widespread abstentions and the Party and the Tcheka found themselves in a
minority at their own conference.
Only a few votes were necessary to secure the complete and legal
victory of the Army, but at this point the delegates from the military
intelligence service, knowing the heavy hand of Aralov, maintained an icy
silence and strict neutrality. Then at the most dramatic moment of the
session Aralov spoke critically of the military opposition, after which the
delegates of the military intelligence service with one voice supported the
Party. The number of supporters of the military opposition shrank to
ninety-five, a clear defeat. The session closed with a victory for the
Party. The military opposition crumbled and many of its members never again
took any action against the Party. The Army had learnt a lesson. In the
struggle against the Party, never count on the support of the military
intelligence service. Emboldened by victory, the Tcheka renewed its
penetration of the Army. Many unrepentant members of the military opposition
were arrested and shot. The humiliation of the Army inevitably affected
military intelligence too, and on 13 May 1919 the Tchekists executed members
of the staff of military intelligence in the 7th Army who had displeased
them. Military intelligence naturally objected sharply to the Tcheka's
taking the law into its own hands, and from that time on it was its sworn
enemy. Lenin was delighted. Military intelligence henceforth was an
inseparable part of the Army, but its chief was the personal enemy of both
the Army and the Tcheka. Another unwritten rule was established in the
organisation of the GRU, too, which was that the chief of the GRU must be
appointed only from among the senior officials of the Tcheka secret police
(historically known as the V. Tcheka, GPU, OGPU, NKVD, NKGB, MGB, MVD and
KGB and unofficially as 'the Organs'). This rule has also been broken
several times, but the Party has always been able to correct its mistake in
time.
The agent network of the GRU was reinforced at almost lightning speed.
There are several reasons for this. Firstly, inside Russia after the
Revolution, in her central provinces alone, there were more than four
million foreigners: Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, Poles, Slovaks, Czechs,
Koreans, Bulgars, Serbs, Croats and others. Most of them were former
prisoners of war. More than three hundred thousand of them voluntarily
enlisted in the Red Army. There was no need to recruit such people. The
overwhelming majority of them were convinced, fanatical communists. Military
intelligence simply sent them off to their own countries as GRU agents.
Secondly, after the Revolution Moscow became the Mecca of communism, and
after the foundation of the Comintern, communists from all countries flocked
to Moscow. The Comintern openly declared as its aim the destruction of
capitalism, and in this manifesto it was helped from all sides, the Tcheka
and the GRU in particular developing their espionage activities. On the
orders of the Comintern [The Communist International, grouping together the
communist parties of the world and declaring itself as 'the headquarters of
the worldwide communist revolution'.], thousands of communists spread into
foreign states worldwide under the control of the Soviet intelligence
organisations. Some of these, like the German communists Richard Sorge and
Karl Ramm, the Finnish communist Otto Kusinien, the Hungarian Sandor Rado,
are now well known to history, but thousands more remained unknown,